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contains rich discussion of skill and expertise. Various texts exalt skilled exemplars (whether 
historical persons or fictional figures) who guide and inspire those seeking virtuosity within a 
particular dao (guiding teaching or way of life). These texts share a preoccupation with 
flourishing, or uncovering and articulating the constituents of an exemplary life. Some core 
features thought requisite to leading such a life included spontaneity, naturalness, and 
effortless ease. However, there was also significant disagreement during this ‘Warring States’ 
or ‘Hundred Schools’ period on which skills were valuable, how one should cultivate them, and 
who exactly ought to serve as exemplars. In this chapter, I discuss two prominent types of 
expertise and their attendant skills. The first is expertise at a particular craft, occupation, or dao, 
which finds its most poignant celebration in the early Daoist anthology Zhuangzi. Interest in 
crafts or skilled occupations was likely motivated by a perceived (or implied) analogy with living 
a good life more generally. The second concerns ethical expertise, a prominent and widely held 
ideal within the Ruist (Confucian) and Mohist schools. Both maintain that ethical expertise 
consists of an ability to apply past models or precedents to current cases, though they diverge 
on what those models are and how to properly apply them. The aim is to provide non-
specialists an overview of this literature in Daoism, Confucianism, and Mohism, while also 
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When reading texts in the classical Chinese philosophical tradition (ca. 6th to 3rd centuries 
BCE), one is struck by regular celebrations of skill and expertise. Various schools of thought 
exalt skilled exemplars (whether historical persons or fictional figures) for guiding and inspiring 
those seeking virtuosity within particular daos (guiding teachings or ways of life), reflecting a 
shared preoccupation with uncovering and articulating the constituents of an exemplary life. 
Indeed, there is substantial overlap on some of the core features thought requisite to leading 
such a life, including spontaneity, naturalness, and effortlessness (e.g. Slingerland, 2007). 
Nonetheless, given the wide array of philosophical thought in this period (later dubbed the 
Hundred Schools period), there was also significant disagreement on what skills were valuable, 
how one should cultivate them, and who exactly ought to serve as exemplars. 
 In what follows, I will discuss two prominent types of expertise and their attendant 
skills. The first is expertise at a particular craft, occupation, or dao, which finds its most 
poignant celebration in the early Daoist anthology Zhuangzi. Interest in crafts or skilled 
occupations was likely motivated by a perceived (or implied) analogy with living a good life 
more generally. The second is ethical expertise, a prominent and widely held ideal within the 
Ruist (Confucian) and Mohist schools. Both maintain that ethical expertise consists of an ability 
to apply past models or precedents to current cases, though they diverge on what those 
models are and how to properly apply them. The aim is to provide non-specialists an overview 
of this literature as well as suggestions about further research. 
 
Skill in Craft and Performance 
Some of the most well-known examples of skill and expertise involve particular crafts, 
professions, or ways of life. Chapter 19 (“Probing Life” 達生) of the Zhuangzi, a compendium of 
early Daoist thought, contains many such examples. The accounts share a common structure: a 
member of the societal elite (e.g. a Duke or Marquis) or a moralizing philosopher (e.g. Kongzi, 
better known to Westerners as Confucius) encounters a person of lower social status engaged 
in a mundane activity, yet with such depth of skill, grace, and proficiency, that it startles him. A 
lesson is thereby seemingly imparted about realms of meaningful human experience that are 
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typically overlooked. Thus, these episodes both valorize skill while also denigrating the 
blinkered perspective of the elite. 
For example, in a representative passage, Kongzi gazes at a waterfall producing rapids 
so turbulent that no sea creatures dare swim in it, and foam so abundant that it persists miles 
downstream. Suddenly, he catches sight of a solitary figure in the water. Thinking this person in 
mortal danger he dispatches a disciple to render aid, only to see the person emerge from the 
depths full of song. Amazed, Kongzi asks for his dao of swimming. Instead, the swimmer 
describes his skill as developing naturally out of his having grown up both on land and in water, 
and thus being adept and at ease in both environments. These were the original circumstances 
given to him (gu 故), and his life course developed naturally therein. He cannot further articulate 
or illuminate his skiil save for thin descriptions (e.g. ‘following the current’). What was ordinary 
from his perspective resulted in a way of life seemingly extraordinary to others. Here, Kongzi 
represents the perspective of a judgmental elite, who claims to possess deep insight on what is 
proper and improper, admirable and inadmirable, and goes around promulgating his beliefs on 
the assumption that people require guidance and education. Kongzi assumes the swimmer 
needs his help, yet he requires none at all. Rather, he has a surety and ease with his own life 
that Kongzi seems to lack (e.g. Møllgaard, 2007, p. 61). The nameless swimmer is thus a foil to 
the famous sage, who is characterized as out of touch and out of his depths. 
The story of Wheelwright Pian in the same chapter follows this pattern of depicting skill 
as something learned through practice and hard to convey with words. “Neither slow nor 
hurried, I feel it through my hand, and it resonates with my mind,” explains the wheelwright. 
“My mouth cannot put it into words. There is a knack in it somewhere that I cannot convey to 
my son, and which he cannot learn from me” (13/37/16-18).1 Here’s the general lesson: 
 
Everyone in the world values dao when found in texts. A text does not go beyond its 
sayings, yet the sayings contain something of value. What is of value in sayings is the 
impressions they convey. The impressions follow from something else, and these cannot 
be transmitted with words. Alas, everyone values mere sayings and so transmits texts. 
Even though everyone values them [i.e. words and books], to me they seem not to 
obtain value; what everyone values is not what’s really of value. (13/37/5-6)  
 
 
1 Translations of the Zhuangzi are my own, though I consulted Graham (2001) and Ziporyn (2009). The 
numbering of sections (Book/Page/Line) refers to the standard ICS concordance. Locations of the textual 
references can also be determined using the Chinese Text Project website: 
http://ctext.org/tools/concordance. My thanks to Chris Fraser for numerous suggestions on parsing the 
original text. Any infelicities are my own. 
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Other stories include further details about the accumulation of skill and how it figures in 
satisfying way of life. In one such story, Kongzi runs into a hunchback catching cicadas with 
amazing dexterity. Kongzi inquires about his skills. The cicada catcher obliges, describing how 
he hones and sharpens his focus by balancing round pellets on top of one another. “If I can 
balance two without dropping them, I’ll lose a few cicadas; if I can balance three, I’ll miss just 
one in ten; if I can balance five, it will be like gathering them off the ground” (19/50/13-14). He 
then describes his heightened state of concentration while catching cicada:  
 
“I settle my body like a tree stump, I hold my arm like the branch of a withered tree. 
Though heaven and earth are vast, though it contains a multitude of things, I am only 
aware of cicada wings. I don’t wander or waver, and I would not trade cicada wings for 
any other thing. How could it be that I’d fail to succeed!” (19/50/14-15) 
 
Kongzi later tells his disciples: “When the will is undivided, it congeals with the spirit” 
(19/50/16). 
This latter term ‘spirit’ is a translation of shen 神, the source of a person’s agency or 
vitality. It reappears in other discussions of skill in the Zhuangzi. In one such story, Kongzi tells 
his student Yan Hui of a time he encountered a ferryman handling a boat as though he were a 
spirit (shen 神). The ferryman claimed that the secret lay in forgetting what others cannot but 
bear in mind (i.e. the risk of drowning). He draws an analogy with high-stakes competitions. 
 
When shooting [your arrow] for earthenware you’re skilful; when shooting for fancy 
belt-buckles you’re apprehensive; when shooting for gold you’re discombobulated. Your 
skill is the same as ever, yet there’s something that you come to be concerned with—
this is attaching weight to what is outside you. Whoever gives weight to what is outside 
him is being clumsy within.’ (19/50/22-23) 
 
Elsewhere, we read of a woodworker named Qing who carved a bellstand so amazing, people 
thought it was made by a ghost or spirit. A Marquis, marveling at his skill, asks his secret. The 
woodworker claims to achieve heightened focus through fasting and forgetting. “After fasting 
three days, I no longer keep in mind congratulations and reward, honors and salary. After five 
days, I no longer keep in mind blame or praise, skill or clumsiness. After seven days, I am so 
intent that I forget that I have a body and four limbs.” The passage continues: 
 
’During this time my lord’s court does not exist for me. My skill concentrates, outside 
distractions melt away, and only then do I go into the mountain forest and observe the 
nature of the wood. When I see one of perfect form—only then is my vision of the 
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bellstand formed, and only then do I put my hands to it. Otherwise, I’ll just give the 
whole thing up… What people took to be the workings of a spirit in the vessel—could 
this be it? (19/52/5-8) 
 
Some have noted similarities between these accounts and the experience of ‘flow’, as 
popularized by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (e.g. Barrett, 2011; Singh, 2014). Consider the 
following conditions that accompany experiences of flow: 
 
● Perceived challenges, or opportunities for action, that stretch (neither over-matching nor 
underutilizing) existing skills; a sense that one is engaging challenges at a level 
appropriate to one’s capacities 
● Clear proximal goals and immediate feedback about the progress that is being made. 
(Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014, p. 240) 
 
There are obvious points of contact here with the skill stories in the Zhuangzi, which involve 
activities that are challenging yet not beyond the skills of the performer, with immediate goals 
internal to the activity itself. There are further parallels in the phenomenology of flow-type 
activities: 
 
● Intense and focused concentration on the present moment. 
● Merging of action and awareness. 
● Loss of reflective self-consciousness (i.e., loss of awareness of oneself as a social actor) 
● A sense of control; that one can in principle deal with the situation because one knows 
how to respond to whatever happens next. 
● Distortion of temporal experience (typically, a sense that time has passed faster than 
normal). 
● Experiencing the activity as intrinsically rewarding, such that the end goal is often a 
mere excuse for the process. 
(Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014, p. 240) 
 
Many of these features of flow are noted explicitly in the stories above, while the rest are either 
consistent with them or can be inferred from them (though cf. Slingerland, 2000; Fraser, 2014). 
I highlighted the use of the term shen (spirit / spirited) in the passages above. It is 
seldom noted, but significant, that in all the cases so far it is a term out-of-touch observers use 
to describe the manifestation of skill (whether in product, performance, or performer). Yet the 
performers themselves do not use this term, and thus it is difficult to know whether the 
observers’ comments should be read as veridical—that is, reflecting the way the author sees 
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these things (as truly spiritual achievements)—or as a reductio, reflecting the worthless 
perspective of the elitist.  
The chief passage in support of the former interpretation is also the most famous skill 
story in the text. It involves a dialogue between a lord and his lowly cook. 
 
Cook Ding was carving up an ox for Lord Wen-hui. Wherever his hand slapped, 
wherever his shoulders dipped, wherever his foot braced, wherever his knees pressed, 
the thwack! and thud! of flesh falling off and knife penetrating flesh was in perfect 
cadence, now in time with the Mulberry Forest Dance, now in tune with the Jing Shou 
Chorus. ’Wow! Excellent!’ said Lord Wen-hui. ‘That skill should attain such heights!’ 
(3/7/30-3/8/2) 
 
These opening lines depict the flow-like state of Cook Ding carving his ox, and the appearance 
of an elite (Lord Wen-hui) once again signals that he is meant to be a foil. The passage 
continues with the cook’s response: 
 
‘What your servant loves is dao; I have advanced past skill. When I first began to carve 
oxen, I saw nothing but the ox. Three years more and I stopped seeing the ox as a 
whole. Nowadays, I encounter it with my spirit, and no longer look with my eyes. My 
overseeing knowledge ceases, and the spirit’s impulses proceed. I rely on nature’s 
layering, cleave along the main seams, follows the main cavities, and go by what is 
inherently so. A ligament or tendon I never touch, not to mention solid bone.  
 
‘A good cook changes his chopper once a year, because he cuts. A common cook 
changes it once a month, because he hacks. Now I have had this chopper for nineteen 
years, and have taken apart several thousand oxen, but the edge is as though it were 
fresh from the whetstone. The joints have spaces gaps, and the edge of the blade has 
no thickness. If you insert what has no thickness into a gap, then there’s wide open 
spaces, and of course there is ample room to move the edge about. That’s why after 
nineteen years the edge of my chopper is as though it were fresh from the whetstone.  
 
’However, whenever I come to something knotty, I resign to the difficulty ahead. I 
proceed with caution and halt my gaze. My actions slow, my blade barely flicks and yet 
the whole thing crumbles to the ground. I stand, knife in hand, looking round proudly at 
the results, dawdling to enjoy the triumph until I’m quite satisfied. I then wipe the blade 
and put it away. ‘  
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’Excellent!’ said Lord Wen-hui. ‘Listening to the words of this cook, I have learned how 
to nurture life. ‘ (3/8/4-11) 
 
Cook Ding’s trance-like flow-states of engagement while carving oxen are described as going 
‘beyond skill’, and indeed Lord Wen-hui is not only amazed at the cook’s performance, but is 
even more impressed by his words. Lord Wen-hui hears the cook discuss his butchery and 
learns something about life and how to nurture it. Presumably, the secret to nurturing life 
involves analogous engagement with the world through one’s spirit (a point that is echoed in 
the next chapter, In the World of Men, though within a political context). 
The cook might thus be taken to represent something above and beyond skill. Edward 
Slingerland, for example, argues that we cannot understand expert skill per se to be the 
ultimate goal of any of the practices above. Skilled mastery in one domain is consistent with 
being an atrocious human being as a whole (e.g. abusive or malevolent to others). For 
Slingerland, this is unacceptable. Instead, we must understand such flow states as representing 
“a perfection of a unique and ultimate skill: the skill of becoming a fully realized human being 
and embodying the Way in the full range of one’s actions”. On this reading, the ideal “involved 
relating the individual to a larger normative cosmic order—as well as presenting an at least 
implicit picture of human nature as it relates to this order”. Thus, this is “first and foremost a 
spiritual ideal... [with] roots in archaic Chinese religion” (Slingerland, 2007, p. 9 emphasis 
added).  
Lee Yearley makes similar arguments. He reads into the text a special notion of drives 
called ‘transcendent’ drives, and he sees such drives depicted and celebrated throughout the 
text of the Zhuangzi.  
 
Transcendent drives generate activities that exceed the normal capacities of the self and 
seem to arise from beyond it. They produce abilities that surpass normal abilities and 
transform normal actions… I find myself able to perform easily and well tasks that 
previously seemed to be far beyond my normal capabilities. Transcendent drives… allow 
powers such as the 神 shen, “daemonic”... to possess a person and therefore they help 
bring to a person the highest possible spiritual fulfillment. (Yearley, 1996, p. 154) 
 
Given this latter spiritual dimension, Yearley maintains that skilled activity in the text 
“transcends what most people would identify as normal skillfulness” (164).2  
Such religious approaches tend to inflate the wondrous qualities of the skills involved, 
and advert to extra variables (e.g. the spirit, the ‘daemonic’, or ‘transcendent drives’) in order to 
 
2 Notwithstanding the prevalence of such interpretations, it remains unclear whether heightened or 
perfected skill is really different in kind as opposed to mere degree. For discussion, see Wenzel (2003). 
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explain this heightened gap between the ordinary and the extraordinary. But, as noted above, 
the fact that some of the activities seem rather ordinary (such as swimming, or catching 
cicadas—something children still do in China today) yet still engendering wonder and awe 
among the elite might instead be making light of just how divorced and alienated these elites 
are. Hans Georg Moeller and Paul J. D’Ambrosio (2017) see both sides at work. However, they 
believe the fact that the skilled protagonists routinely reject being extraordinary weighs in favor 
of a more deflationary reading. 
 
The extreme waterfall diver at Lüliang, the nameless drunkard mastering the art of 
falling off carts unharmed, and Cook Ding, the symphonic slaughterer, are oddly 
exaggerated ‘players,’ partly surreal and partly comical, partly mundane and partly 
miraculous. They are larger than life and at the same time most average, wonderful, and 
ordinary. Their stupefying skills are accompanied by the utmost unpretentiousness. 
These paradoxical artists disown their arts…. Thus, both the artisans and their arts are 
de-idolized and ‘normalized,’ and a routine of a paradoxically common and contingent 
excellence that one may or may not engage in emerges. (Moeller and D’Ambrosio, 2017, 
pp. 183–184) 
  
The Zhuangzi is not alone for containing noteworthy depictions of skill and mastery. 
Thinkers and texts we now associate with the Ruist (or Confucian) tradition also invoke 
examples of skill and expertise across a number of domains, including (and especially) skill at 
forging human cultural and societal institutions. Exemplars of these kinds are venerated by the 
Ru for both creating and perpetuating culture through acts of human artifice (wei 偽), for it is 
only through their faithful transmission that culture can persist and thrive, benefiting and 
beautifying humankind. In the classical text The Rites of Zhou (周禮), we find a typical way the 
Ru saw these things. 
 
The knowledgeable fashion things; the skillful transmit and maintain these things 
through generations. They are called artisans. The affairs of the hundred artisans are all 
thus creations of the sages. Some smelt metal to make knives; some harden the earth to 
make implements; some build chariots to travel over hills; some build boats to travel 
over water. All of these are things that were created by the sages. (Puett, 2001, p. 77)  
 
However, what is most striking from a contemporary perspective is the prevalence of a certain 
kind of expertise venerated by the Ru and Mohists alike. This is the idea of moral or ethical 
expertise. 
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Ethical Expertise  
The examples adduced above represent apt domains of expertise. As Christian Helmut Wenzel 
writes, the invocation of skill in these contexts is apt “because there is a specified range of 
objects, which corresponds to the specific craftsmanship, and because there are certain criteria 
of success that are available right from the start. Cook Ting [Ding] does not try to be a good 
swimmer, and the ferryman does not cut oxen” (Wenzel 119). By contrast, the idea that one 
might be an expert (or highly skilled) at ethics seems odd. What does ethical expertise consist 
of? How is it possible? The criteria themselves are subject to much dispute (should we focus on 
intent, character, or consequences?), and demonstrating ethical expertise seems problematic. If 
one were to skeptically interrogate the cicada catcher about whether he really has skill, he can 
just show the bounty of his hunt, for example. What could be the analogue in the ethical 
domain? Answering these questions would obviously take us far beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Nonetheless, some early Ruist texts had answers to these questions.  
At a basic level, these texts maintained that one can be an expert at ethics because the 
core of ethics consists of adhering to and exemplifying norms of ritualized propriety (li 禮), a set 
of traditional protocols, ceremonies, rules of etiquette, and other formalized aspects of social 
interaction that, from their perspective, were honed and perfected by preceding generations of 
sagacious rulers and ministers, and passed down as a cultural inheritance that could then form 
the basis of an ethics curriculum.3 The li included detailed and formalized rites and ceremonies 
keyed to significant life events on one end of a spectrum, with etiquette, manners, and basic 
courtesy on the other. They were thought to constitute the wisdom of ancient sages of 
impeccable character, and were revered as holding the key to proper enculturation, 
humanization, and communication. (A nearby, if imperfect, analogue for modern Westerners 
might be the norms governing conduct of the nobility in Victorian England.) These norms—the 
li—would apply to most social situations, and could be analogically extended to apply to all 
facets of life (Sarkissian, 2014).  
 It is important to note just how demanding the li were, and how long the Ru thought it 
would take to gain mastery of them. In the Analects (a collection of sayings and anecdotes 
about Kongzi and his immediate circle of interlocutors), for example, Kongzi claims to have 
started diligent study and practice at the age of 15, and only at the age of 70 had he 
internalizing these norms and honed his ethical sense such that his immediate inclinations were 
always correct (Analects 2.4). Xunzi (a 3rd century BCE Ru), takes up this line with vigor, and is 
at pains to note that skill or mastery at ethics does not consist of mere memorization of rules or 
 
3 The traditional ‘Six Arts’ (六藝) of education included not only the rites (禮), but also music (樂), archery 
(射). charioteering (御), calligraphy (書), and mathematics (數). We focus on ritual, as it was considered 
most central. 
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rote mimicry of others, but must also involve grace, dignity, and an ability to elicit from others 
(especially those less conversant in the ceremony) appropriate feelings and attitudes.  
Nonetheless, they maintain that ethical expertise is amenable to the kind of sustained, 
iterative improvement accompanying other forms of skill acquisition noted above, provided one 
has proper guidance. Justin Tiwald (2012), for example, has explicated Xunzi’s model of 
expertise by noting two kinds of ethical knowledge a student must master. The first is 
knowledge of general models (fa 法) of ethical behavior. Much of this will include knowledge of 
the li as well as paradigmatic instances of right actions, and can be fairly general at their level of 
description (e.g. one must not address one’s parents in a disrespectful fashion). The second 
kind of knowledge concerns how to apply these models in one’s own life. Both kinds of 
knowledge—though especially the second—require guidance by expert teachers or mentors 
(shi 師). “Ritual is that by which to correct your person. The teacher is that by which to correct 
your practice of ritual. If you are without ritual, then how will you correct your person? If you are 
without a teacher, how will you know that your practice of ritual is right?” (Hutton, 2014, p. 14) 
 
Anyone on the streets can become a Yu [a sage king]. How do I mean this? I say: that by 
which Yu was Yu was because he was ren [humane], yi [right], lawful, and correct. Thus, 
ren, yi, lawfulness, and correctness have patterns that can be known and can be 
practiced. However, people on the streets all have the material for knowing ren, yi, 
lawfulness, and correctness, and they all have the equipment for practicing ren, yi, 
lawfulness, and correctness. Thus, it is clear that they can become a Yu. (Hutton, 2014, 
p. 254) 
 
Teachers help the student to match these models of ethical behavior to particular 
circumstances. Through such guidance, the student is able to gradually deepen their 
understanding of the ethical life. They will come to see, for example, how the various models 
(the first kind of knowledge) hang together and form a coherent set, and how they instantiate a 
wider system of goods and values.4  
Through such direct, personal, and experiential forms of learning, students can begin to 
note for themselves how various locutions or details of their comportment can signal respect, 
care, and consideration of others, and how their own conduct impacts and moves them. By 
noting their successes and failures, those pursuing ethical mastery can eventually achieve a 
kind of ‘deliberative autonomy’ whereby they no longer require the aid of teachers or mentors 
 
4 One might wonder which of the numerous kings and heroes of antiquity to take as models. Choosing 
from among them would likely require expertise of its own. Amy Olberding (2012), for example, has 
argued that the nature of Kongzi’s expertise lay in his ability to identify true exemplars and articulate the 
coherence among them by developing by developing a shared vocabulary. 
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to correct their practices, and can engage in reflection and self-correction in an effective 
manner themselves. Some have suggested that this overall picture of ethical knowledge or 
expertise cannot be readily assimilated into categories such as ‘knowing that’ or even ‘knowing 
how’. Instead, some early Ruist texts contain a distinctive notion which we might understand as 
knowing to, as in knowing to act in the moment (Lai, 2012; Hetherington and Lai, 2015). This 
too can be understood as a kind of expert skill. Others, such as Aaron Stalnaker, have argued 
that particular virtues in these classical Ruist texts should be thought of as partially constituted 
by mastery of a certain set of skills (Stalnaker, 2010). Still others have characterized this kind of 
skill as driven by intuitive inclinations cultivated through the sustained accumulation of a broad 
range of concrete experiences. Borrowing from Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis 
(Damasio, 2006), the current author has argued that expertise involves the honing of 
spontaneous inclination. According to Damasio, as one encounters particular situation types, 
one’s mind is full of a diverse repertoire of latent inclinations attuned to the situation at hand via 
past experience. Each of these have a qualitative feel or valence (e.g. “that might be good,” “this 
might be bad,” etc.), working to limit the possible actions and outcomes to pursue. Sarkissian 
argues that this “fine-tunes and accelerates the decision-making process; at the limit, the 
correct course of action would come to mind immediately, with compelling emotional valence.” 
 
 In completely novel situations, we may be at a loss for an appropriate response, leaving 
us immobile. Similarly, where social configurations trigger overlapping schemes 
associated with multiple markers, we may be perplexed and unsure how to react. This 
can occur, for example, in situations where we find individuals playing roles we are not 
accustomed to seeing them play or when we encounter individuals acting according to 
situational norms that conflict with our own. However, familiarity with a broad range of 
emotions, facilitated through exposure to literature, art, and social rituals, will allow one 
to perceive values in a wide range of scenarios, thus improving the likelihood of 
responding appropriately in any particular situation. (Sarkissian, 2010a, p. 7)  
 
When ethical skill advances sufficiently, and as one becomes recognized as trustworthy and 
reliable, the Ru maintain that one cultivates a felt presence or personal power (de 德), a kind of 
gravitas or charisma that accompanies one’s behavior and judgments, lending one authority 
and rendering others cooperative and agreeable—disposed to defer to one’s ethical expertise 
(Nivison, 2002; Sarkissian, 2010b, 2017; Barnwell, 2013).  
Thus far, the account of ethical expertise has focused largely on two early thinkers in the 
Ru school—namely, Kongzi and Xunzi. The 4th century BCE thinker Mengzi (better known to 
Westerners as Mencius), shares much in common with them. However, his model of expertise 
departs from theirs in distinct ways. A key passage occurs in Mengzi 6A7. There, Mengzi infers 
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that our sensory modalities each have built-in preferences, explaining why expert musicians 
can produce orchestrations that delight any who hear it, or why expert cooks can produce 
dishes that delight anyone who taste them. By analogy, the human heart (xin 心), the cite of 
cognition, affect, and volition (thus also translated as heart/mind) must have built-in 
preferences too. Mengzi claims that the sage kings venerated by the Ru (such as Yao and Shun) 
discovered what these were, and promulgated ethical standards of order (li 理) and rightness 
(yi 義) to others, who similarly delighted in them. In an extended discussion of this passage, 
Hutton claims that, for Mengzi, “the sages’ moral knowledge consists in a developed ethical 
‘taste,’ much as Yi Ya’s culinary knowledge and Music Master Kuang’s musical knowledge 
consist in a kind of cultivated expertise” (Hutton, 2002, p. 172). On this view, “the sages are 
above all connoisseurs of the human heart. Their focus is inward, and what their special 
knowledge concerns is not so much human behavior in general and the way the world at large 
works per se, but rather what sorts of behaviors and states of affairs are most pleasing to the 
heart, given its innate preferences” (ibid., 174).  
However, as Dobin Choi (2018) points out, if we take the analogy with Yi Ya and Shi 
Kuang seriously, it is more likely that Mengzi meant to analogize the sages’ morally admirable 
behavior and personal example to Yi Ya’s dishes and Music Master Kuang’s compositions. The 
sages are not merely connoisseurs in the sense of being able to perceive what is morally good; 
rather, they enact moral goodness through their own persons and the virtues and values they 
exemplify. Upon contemplating the sages’ behavior, other people delight in it, just as they do 
masterful dishes and compositions. This suggests a similar structure to all the analogies above: 
there is an expert who creates or uncovers something that elicits a sentiment of approval 
among the people, showing that people have innate preferences; moreover, the sentiment of 
approval elicited by the people itself instantiates or affirms the excellence of the expert creation. 
The Ru were not alone in venerating cultural heroes of the past and holding them up as 
models of expertise to emulate. This was also the orientation of the Mohists, a rival school of 
thinkers similarly engaged in the project of social and political reform. They disagreed with the 
Ru on which figures were worthy of emulation and for what reasons, and their conception of 
expertise thus adverted to a distinct set of concerns. The Mohists rejected the idea that 
traditional customs, mores, and ceremonies ought to be taken as reliable guides to what is 
right. When they look to the sage kings as models, they do not include the sorts of cultural 
achievements and traditional practices that comprised the Ru curriculum and generally 
established as customary among the elite (such as lavish funerals for one’s deceased parents). 
Rather, they argued that one must have an objective standard to define which customs are 
beneficial and ought to be perpetuated, and which are detrimental and ought to be abandoned 
or reformed. Importantly, they argued that the sage rules of antiquity ought to be followed 
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because they modeled themselves on just such an objective standards—namely Tian 天 or 
Heaven, a supernatural agent of impartial concern.  
 
It is said that there is no standard like Heaven. Heaven is broad and unselfish in its 
actions, and is generous in its bestowing without considering itself virtuous. Its radiance 
is enduring and does not decay. Therefore, the sage kings took it as the standard… 
Undoubtedly what Heaven desires is that there be mutual love and mutual benefit 
among people. (Johnston, 2009, p. 27) 
 
If this is so Heaven’s intentions might be modeled by people directly. And such modeling is 
depicted as a kind of skill, analogous to those needed in crafts.  
 
The hundred craftsmen make what is square with a square, make what is round with 
compasses, use a straight edge to establish what is straight, determine the horizontal 
with a water level, and the vertical with a plumb line. Whether skilled or unskilled, 
craftsmen all take these five things as standards. Skilled craftsmen are able to comply 
with these standards whilst unskilled craftsmen, even if they are unable to comply with 
them, will still surpass themselves if they follow them in their work. Thus the hundred 
craftsmen all have standards as a basis for their work. Nowadays, the greatest 
[achievement] is to bring order to the world and the next greatest is to bring order to a 
large country, but to attempt these things without reliance on standards is to compare 
unfavourably in wisdom with the hundred craftsmen. (ibid., 25) 
 
Given this general sketch, we can now outline what ethical expertise consists of for the 
Mohists: an ability (that is, a capability or disposition) to discriminate and apply correct models 
or paradigms to current circumstances, with these models being the precedents of sage kings 
guided by, and conforming to, the will of Heaven. In an upshot, expert ethical action should 
promote the will of Heaven, which is to secure material benefit and care for all. According to 
Chad Hansen, the Mohists advert to this objective standard, yet remain dependent on teachers 
to guide one’s application of the standard. The Mohists 
 
… take for granted that things really are similar and different. On the basis of objective 
similarity and difference, we make socially approved distinctions. Once we have 
achieved virtuosity or competence in discriminating, we assume that our use is correct. 
Thus it is that Mozi cannot dispense with Confucius' teacher-student method of 
transmission even though he wants a more objective, realistic content. Our basic 
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linguistic skill in making distinctions requires a string of teacher-student embodiments. 
(Hansen, 1992, p. 104) 
 
Similarly, Chris Fraser argues that what drives ethical action for the Mohists “is mainly ability or 
know-how (zhi 知), which is largely the result of skill training. Moral education and cultivation 
thus are processes similar in important respects to skill development” (Fraser, 2016, p. 23). 
 
Action is regarded as a skilled response to things or situations. It is triggered by the 
agent’s distinguishing a thing or situation as being of a certain kind and thus invoking a 
relevant, normatively appropriate response. Instead of tying agency to our capacity for 
reasoning, this model bases it primarily on our capacity to acquire and exercise skills and 
virtues. (ibid., 76)5 
 
The Mohists advocate reforming governing structures and hierarchies so as to promote those 
who are just so skilled, who they deem the worthy (xian 賢). Good government requires this 
kind of ethical expertise, which in turn demands a degree of individual autonomy, or the ability 
to make such classifications oneself independent of one’s superiors (Brindley, 2007). In other 
words, making correct ethical judgments is a form of skill, and ethical failure results from a lack 
of such skill. 
While diverging in certain important aspects, both the Ru and the Mohist conceptions of 
ethical expertise presuppose and rely upon the skilled matching of previously learned models to 
particular cases. Fraser (2009, p. 76) argues that we can take this general model as 
paradigmatic of classical conceptions of agency.  
 
Concluding Thoughts / Future Research 
Several classical thinkers in the Chinese tradition thought that central agentic notions such as 
deliberating, choosing, and acting consisted of a kind of analogical reasoning. When one is 
deciding what to do or judging right from wrong, one analogizes the current case to a 
rehearsed set of models or prior examples that comprised one’s basic education. Through this 
process, one sorts objects, actions, or entire states of affairs as falling under one classification 
or other. Prior learning provides one with response patterns to suit these various classifications. 
 
5 Fraser argues that Xunzi, discussed previously, builds on the Mohist model by further emphasizing the 
importance of teachers and mentors in learning how to properly discriminate and apply models (Fraser, 
2016, p. 57). In chapter 8 of his received text (“The Achievements of the Ru”), Xunzi claims that what 
distinguishes the great person from the petty person is precisely this ability to properly discriminate 
objects and categorize them correctly. 
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To use an example, coming upon an instance where one might deem a person ‘upright’ (zheng 
正) would require a skill to draw analogies between aspects of a person’s conduct, reputation, 
etc., and a past paradigm of ‘uprightness’. If the analogies are sufficiently strong, this would 
trigger relevant attitudes (e.g. admiration or deference) automatically. Judging the strength of 
analogy may require careful reasoning. Yet with a suitably rich experiential base from which to 
draw, implicit or explicit comparisons become more and more finely attuned. Over time, this 
process becomes less demanding and more spontaneous, and one’s immediate inclinations to 
action align with normatively sanctioned responses. The crucial thing for present purposes is 
that this is a task that one can hone over time, gaining skill and mastery through incessant 
practice. The current author (Sarkissian, 2010a) has suggested a cognitive model that might 
help to explicate the mechanisms underwriting such a practice. Further research can help to 
develop and refine this general picture. If true, it suggests that various forms or skill and 
expertise rest upon shared assumptions about normal, healthy forms of agency.  
Put another way, the depictions of skill and expertise above might all be underwritten 
by a shared capacity for pattern-recognition. The cook in the Zhuangzi story understands the 
natural patterns in the ox so as to effectively carve it up without dulling his blade; the skillful 
ritual expert must understand the patterns of emotional reaction and response in his audience 
so as to properly execute the rite; and the perspicacious student must come to learn how 
certain small tokens of behavior or small turns of event routinely unfold and resonate with other 
phenomena. Future work might examine more carefully the connections between metaphysical 
notions such as patterning on the one hand, and epistemological capacities such as recognizing 
and analogizing on the other.6 
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